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Abstract—We revisit the problem of entity authentication in
decentralized end-to-end encrypted email and secure messaging
to propose a practical and self-sustaining cryptographic solution
based on password-authenticated key exchange (PAKE). This not
only allows users to authenticate each other via shared low-
entropy secrets, e.g., memorable words, without a public key
infrastructure or a trusted third party, but it also paves the
way for automation and a series of cryptographic enhancements;
improves security by minimizing the impact of human error and
potentially improves usability. First, we study a few vulnera-
bilities in voice-based out-of-band authentication, in particular
a combinatorial attack against lazy users, which we analyze in
the context of a secure email solution. Next, we propose solving
the problem of secure equality test using PAKE to achieve entity
authentication and to establish a shared high-entropy secret key.
Our solution lends itself to offline settings, compatible with the
inherently asynchronous nature of email and modern messaging
systems. The suggested approach enables enhancements in key
management such as automated key renewal and future key
pair authentications, multi-device synchronization, secure secret
storage and retrieval, and the possibility of post-quantum security
as well as facilitating forward secrecy and deniability in a
primarily symmetric-key setting. We also discuss the use of
auditable PAKEs for mitigating a class of online guess and abort
attacks in authentication protocols.
Index Terms—Authentication, Key Management, Secure Email
and Messaging, Password-Authenticated Key Exchange
I. INTRODUCTION
The use of email and instant messaging (IM) has become
pervasive and entrenched in the fabric of modern commu-
nication. Thanks to cryptography, modern messaging tools
have reached a considerable degree of sophistication (e.g.,
Signal) and offer advanced security features ranging from
end-to-end encryption to forward secrecy and deniability.
For these reasons, coupled with better usability, although
email has a long history and remains undeniably popular
with hundreds of billions of emails exchanged on a daily
basis (Clark et al., 2018), secure messaging has often been
recommended by security experts as the go-to tool for secure
communication. Yet, secure messaging and email share two
long-standing challenges, namely entity authentication and key
management.
The primary concern is entity authentication, which invari-
ably involves a mechanism that associates some cryptographic
material with an identity, e.g., public key authentication. Key
management, affecting email more acutely, is intertwined with
authentication and the need for automating it has been known
for a long time, e.g., see (Ruoti et al., 2018).
Over the years, several methods have been established to
tackle authentication, and indirectly key management: man-
ual validation, web of trust, public key infrastructure (PKI)
and hierarchical validation, public key directories as well as
server-derived public keys such as identity-based encryption
(IBE). The set of viable candidates becomes much smaller
once we consider a decentralized setting, i.e., without a PKI
or a trusted third party (TTP). For this scenario, the body
of work on key authentication contains hundreds of works
focusing on methods based on the use of out-of-band (OOB)
channels and short authentication string (SAS) comparisons,
see Section I-C. However, when it comes to schemes that rely
on low-entropy shared secrets, which is what we address here,
the only work that to the best of our knowledge proposes
a solution is by (Alexander and Goldberg, 2007). They use
a modified solution to the socialist millionaires’ problem
(SMP) by (Boudot et al., 2001), also known as secure equality
test, for authentication in the off-the-record messaging (OTR)
protocol.
Due to the required user interaction in most of these
approaches, e.g., for verifying the authenticity of an inter-
locutor’s public key, usability plays a key role in achieving
authentication. Reducing the gap between security and usabil-
ity, by finding optimal trade-offs, has been a central theme for
decades with a plethora of long-standing open problems, e.g.,
see (Unger et al., 2015; Clark et al., 2018).
Here we revisit the problem of authenticating public keys
in a decentralized setting and propose a user-friendly and ro-
bust approach based on password-authenticated key exchange
(PAKE) to solve SMP via low-entropy secrets. These secrets
are not expected to be sampled from a large, uniformly
distributed space, but rather from a small set of values, e.g.,
typical human-memorable passwords or pin numbers. The task
of SMP boils down to two parties verifying equality of their
inputs πA and πB in a zero-knowledge manner such that by
the end they learn nothing but the boolean result of the test.
By solving SMP via PAKE, we also establish a shared cryp-
tographically strong secret key, making further cryptographic
enhancements possible. Furthermore, this approach would not
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require any understanding of cryptographic concepts from the
user, e.g., knowing about public-keys and fingerprints.
We also show how the suggested approach would not only
work naturally in the context of secure messaging, but also
in the inherently asynchronous setting of email. Apart from
offering improved usability properties and eliminating a host
of vulnerabilities present in OOB-based protocols, as discussed
in Section III, we show how the PAKE-generated secret key
can be used to pave the path towards providing a series of
enhancements in secure email and messaging. These include
inattentive user resistance, automated key renewal, automated
future key pair authentication and multi-device synchroniza-
tion, along with security properties such as deniability, forward
secrecy, post-quantum security, auditability for detecting guess
and abort attacks, secure secret storage and retrieval with
applications in email and secure messaging.
By applying PAKE to this problem, we advance the
state-of-the-art in the use of shared low-entropy secrets
for entity authentication, an idea considered only in
(Alexander and Goldberg, 2007). Also note that while SMP
is a subproblem solved naturally by PAKE, the latter has not
been applied to the problem of authenticating public keys in
decentralized settings.
A. Motivation
Entity authentication in decentralized, non-PKI environ-
ments is generally brushed aside. Solutions that do con-
sider this problem typically rely on users correctly executing
a manual comparison and even tend to keep this feature
rather hidden, e.g., Signal. Our incentive for replacing OOB
authentication with a cryptographic protocol is the impact
of failures occurring in methods highly-dependent on user
behavior, which could completely jeopardize security.
Our motivation for using PAKE—a method that does not
seem to have enjoyed enough recognition due to a lack of
mature implementations, reluctance towards client side crypto,
patent-encumbered designs and perhaps even unawareness
of its usefulness—is grounded not only in its independence
from a PKI or a TTP, but also in its provision of a zero-
knowledge (ZK) solution for the secure equality test problem
using a low number of rounds, compatible with asynchronous
settings, and in the fact that it enables additional cryptographic
enhancements.
We were also motivated by two open problems stressed
by (Unger et al., 2015; Clark et al., 2018): bridging the gap
between known theoretical results and real-world solutions,
and the need for more robust authentication methods that
also improve the trade-off between security and usability in
secure solutions. Finally, the need for addressing common
challenges such as key management automation and device
synchronization also spurred us on.
B. Contributions and structure
After a brief review of the state-of-the-art in Section I-C, we
cover background concepts in Section II. In Section III, we fo-
cus on a few vulnerabilities in the use of OOB channels for au-
thentication, including a partial preimage attack aimed at lazy
users, which we analyze in the context of the p≡p secure email
solution. In Section IV, we present an efficient PAKE-based
solution for authentication in secure messaging and email
via low-entropy secrets, which enables further cryptographic
enhancements. We provide a concrete illustrative scheme along
with an analysis of various PAKE constructions and properties
relevant for our work. We show how our proposal can be used
to achieve additional cryptographic tasks and properties such
as automation in key management and key renewal, forward
secrecy in a symmetric-key setting, deniability, post-quantum
security, secure secret retrieval, and auditability for mitigating
a certain class of online guess and abort attacks. We briefly
analyze network transport mechanisms and security. Section V
concludes with remarks on future work.
C. Related Work
The works of (Unger et al., 2015) and (Clark et al., 2018)
provide extensive systematic surveys on secure messaging and
email covering numerous aspects. We limit ourselves to the
decentralized setting without elaborating on the drawbacks
of web of trust approaches covered in the above mentioned
works.
The literature contains a sizeable body of work
on OOB-based approaches, considered first by
(Rivest and Shamir, 1984), many of which are inspired by the
original work of (Vaudenay, 2005) based on SAS comparisons,
e.g., (Nguyen and Roscoe, 2011; Kainda et al., 2009;
Kainda et al., 2010; Tan et al., 2017), to name a few. This
area has also been investigated by the formal methods
community, see e.g. (Delaune et al., 2017) for a recent
formal analysis of SAS-based schemes in the symbolic
model.
As for low-entropy secret-based authentication, to the
best of our knowledge, in the only work in the literature,
(Alexander and Goldberg, 2007) use a modified version of
a solution to SMP (Boudot et al., 2001), which is mainly
suitable for synchronous settings, to improve authentication
in OTR (Borisov et al., 2004).
II. FRAMEWORK AND PRELIMINARIES
We use A and B to refer to honest parties Alice and Bob,
and M for the adversary, Mallory. We use ←$ to denote
an element sampled uniformly at random, and ‖ to denote
concatenation. We denote low-entropy secrets provided by
users with π.
Security model.We consider the standard Dolev-Yao model
(Dolev and Yao, 1981). We do not assume any trusted in-
frastructure. In one of our proposed methods for transport
protocol, we assume the existence of untrusted buffer/relay
servers, somewhat akin to the ones used in the design of
Signal or OTR4 (see Section IV-C). Regarding PAKEs, we will
consider various constructions in Section IV, largely proven
secure in the so-called BPR model (Bellare et al., 2000) under
various hardness assumptions.
Cryptographic notions. For space reasons, we assume
familiarity with common cryptographic concepts, in particu-
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lar with Diffie-Hellman (DH)-based computational hardness
assumptions.
We discuss schemes based on the Ring Learning With
Errors (RLWE) problem, a special case of the Learning With
Errors (LWE) problem whose security may be reducible to
the hardness of solving the Shortest Vector Problem (SVP) in
lattices, for which no efficient quantum algorithms are known,
thus conjectured to be quantum-secure. Post-quantum (PQ)
cryptography encompasses schemes that are considered to be
safe against adversaries equipped with scalable, cryptograph-
ically relevant quantum computers.
We use KDF(s) to denote a key derivation function that
takes a source s of keying material, typically with a fair
amount of entropy but not uniformly distributed, and pro-
duces one or more cryptographically strong secret keys, see
(Krawczyk, 2010) for details. We denote with MAC(k,m) a
keyed message authentication code scheme that computes a
tag on m under key k.
System requirements. We assume standard requirements
for email transfer as our proposal does not require any format
modifications and preserves compatibility between existing
systems. As for secure messaging, we do not introduce any
extra trust assumptions and no additional infrastructure would
be required. Any exchanges relayed or buffered by intermedi-
ate servers can be done by untrusted ones.
Socialist Millionaires’ Problem. In the realm of secure
multi-party computation (MPC), Yao’s millionaires’ problem
(Yao, 1982) is a famous example in which two parties want
to find out whose input is greater without revealing any more
information on the actual value. SMP is a variant of this and a
ZK proof of knowledge protocol, with the difference that the
parties only wish to know if their inputs are equal.
A series of works have been dedicated to solving SMP,
including a well-known solution by (Boudot et al., 2001) that
provides a fair and efficient protocol, where fairness roughly
means that no party can evaluate the function and walk away
with the result without the other party learning the output.
(Garay et al., 2004) showed that the fairness and the se-
curity definition of (Boudot et al., 2001) are not compatible
with the simulation paradigm and that their solution would
not be secure when composed concurrently; they present a
construction that can be composed arbitrarily, with similar
complexity results.
PAKE. Password-authenticated key exchange (PAKE) pro-
tocols enable the establishment of secure channels without the
need for a PKI, TTPs or empirical OOB channels. They allow
two parties who share only a low-entropy secret, hereafter
password, to agree on a cryptographically strong shared secret
key, using the password for authentication.
Since the seminal work of (Bellovin and Merritt, 1992),
numerous PAKE protocols have been proposed, which largely
fall into the two categories of balanced (symmetric) and
augmented (or asymmetric), referred to as aPAKE. The latter
stores one-way mappings of passwords on the server side in
client-server settings.
Intuitively, a core property of PAKE is that a run of the
protocol should not leak any information about the password.
Moreover, they should be resistant to offline dictionary attacks;
an online guessing attack with at most one test per run should
be the optimal attack strategy for an active M interacting
with a party. Similar to SMP, M can mask failed guessing
attempts as network failures, thus allowing numerous attempts
without raising suspicion. This is in general unavoidable,
however, we will see in Section IV how a recent work by
(Roscoe and Ryan, 2017) can mitigate this.
III. PITFALLS IN OUT-OF-BAND
AUTHENTICATION
In OOB authentication, users compare some representation of
a cryptographic hash (fingerprint) of their partners’ public keys
via a separate authenticated channel. This representation is
usually in the form of a list of words, numbers or images.
Strong security and usability properties can be achieved
if users execute the manual verification correctly. Yet, the
difficulty of having users do the assigned tasks correctly while
finding the right balance between usability and security is
the root cause of security pitfalls, which have been amply
discussed by research on fingerprint and SAS comparison via
OOB channels (see Section I-C). Usability studies encourage
the replacement of manual comparisons by automated software
whenever possible (Tan et al., 2017).
Selection of an adequate OOB channel. In prac-
tice, the theoretical and strong authentication requirements
of OOB methods are not easy to satisfy. While face-to-
face conversations provide a strong authenticated channel
(Nguyen and Roscoe, 2011), they are often not viable. It is
usually assumed that an OOB channel cannot be forged,
but it can be blocked, overheard, delayed or replayed. Typ-
ical instantiations are done via voice-based channels, e.g.
a phone call. However, some already consider voice-based
SAS comparison to be obsolete from a security perspective
(Unger et al., 2015) as nowadays messages can be forged by
voice synthesizers with a small sample of the victim’s voice.
Indeed, a voice impersonation attack on users comparing PGP
words (Shirvanian and Saxena, 2014) reported the fake voice
to be indistinguishable in about 50% of the cases.
Social engineering attacks. There are multiple ways for
humans to interact via OOB, but with few indications about
secure, privacy-preserving, or fair ways to do it, e.g., without
knowing the authentication value,M can foolA by pretending
to be B, asking her to read the words first, and confirming a
full match.
Inattentive and lazy users. Users misreading words (inat-
tentive) or comparing only subsets of them (lazy). A recent
paper by (Naor et al., 2018) analyzes approaches based on
SAS authentication that are vulnerable to MITM attacks w.r.t.
lazy users. For instance, the approach in WhatsApp and Signal
would be flawed if users compared only either the first or the
second half of the value, since it would amount to verifying
only one peer’s fingerprint. To fix this, the authors propose an
influence spreading technique in which every bit of the value
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to be authenticated influences the generation of each element
of the OOB representation.
Partial preimage attack. (Dechand et al., 2016) study an
attack aimed at finding a partial preimage for a fingerprint
verified by lazy users; specifically, they assume that subsets
of bits at the boundaries and in the middle are checked. Let p
denote the probability of finding a partial preimage for a given
fingerprint f and q its complementary event. To calculate p =
1−q, we work out q (i.e., the absence of partial preimages for a
specific bit permutation). Let b be the length of the fingerprint
f and assuming that r consecutive boundary bits are fixed
(checked by the user), in this case, the leftmost and rightmost
bits of f , we let ℓ denote the number of remaining bits in
the middle from which a possible variation of u bits could
be fixed, i.e., checked by the user. Thus, we have 2 · r + u
fixed bits that the adversary cannot invert without the user
noticing. Valid preimages can thus be obtained by flipping up
to t = ℓ − u bits within the middle bits; by removing these
from the total space of size 2b, we obtain the number of invalid
ones. With k denoting a given number of positions to modify,
the valid strings are then given by
(
ℓ
k
)
choices of positions to
flip. Thus, q is given by
q =
2b −
∑t
k=1
(
ℓ
k
)
2b
. (1)
Expressing p as a function of the computational effort in terms
of e brute-force attempts, we have p = 1 − qe. To estimate
the number of steps needed for finding partial preimages
with a success probability ≥ p, we simply compute e =
logq(1 − p). Expressing e in base 2 gives results comparable
to (Dechand et al., 2016).
A. Case Study
Pretty Easy Privacy (p≡p) is a software aimed at providing
usable privacy-by-default in email via end-to-end opportunistic
encryption. The tool largely automates initial key generation
and storage. The public key of a user is attached to outgoing
emails when a key of the recipient has not been stored.
Received keys are automatically stored for future use (trust-
on-first-use) and outgoing emails are automatically encrypted
when a public key of the intended receiver is available. This
approach requires neither a PKI nor a TTP.
Similar to the PGP word list, p≡p trustwords
(Birk et al., 2019) are natural language words that two
users compare via a low-bandwidth OOB authenticated
channel to prevent man-in-the-middle (MITM) attacks. The
trustwords generation algorithm tws(·) is a deterministic
algorithm that runs locally taking as input the public key of
the peer obtained by email and the user’s own public key.
Informally, tws(·) performs an XOR over the fingerprints of
each of the input arguments, and then maps each block of
16 bits from the resulting 160-bit long string to a word in a
predefined dictionary of size 216, thus yielding a list of ten
words.
To encourage users to perform the OOB authentication, by
default p≡p shows only five words; this means that the peers
compare the first 80 out of the 160 bits of a PGP fingerprint,
assuming that they check all the words. Since an “influence
spreading” property, similar to Naor et al.’s, is already present,
the best adversarial strategy is a brute-force attack over the
public key space requiring O
(
280
)
steps to find a key k such
that the first 80 bits of fpr(k) are equal to those of fpr(pkB),
with pkB being the public key of B.
We consider lazy users and compute estimates for partial
preimage attacks similar to the one presented above. We
consider the two cases where, out of five words, the user
verifies (i) the first and last words as well as two from the
middle (ii) the first and last words, along with one of the three
in the middle. Let b = 80, ℓ = 48 and for (i) we have u = 32
and we get e ≈ 238; for (ii), with u = 16, we get e ≈ 232.
These results show that M would succeed with costs equal
to and lower than the computational power estimated for an
average adversary (Dechand et al., 2016).
Clearly the decision to show five words instead of ten by
default needs to be reconsidered. Users might feel less annoyed
by having to compare fewer words, however, its adverse effect
on security is considerable as it practically renders brute-force
attacks viable.
IV. AUTHENTICATION IN EMAIL AND
MESSAGING VIA PAKE
We now show how PAKE can be used to perform a secure
equality test and thereby authentication. Compared to OTR
that uses a modified solution to the SMP protocol, we show
that our PAKE-based approach yields a more efficient solution
with better security guarantees and enables further crypto-
graphic features.
Trust establishment using low-entropy secrets. For A
and B to mutually authenticate, for now we assume that they
share a low-entropy secret—e.g., a short password—either
agreed upon beforehand or decided by posing and answering
a question. Intuitively, the goal is to perform a secure equality
test such that upon termination of the protocol,A and B would
only learn whether or not their respective secrets πA and πB
were the same, thus authenticating each other on the basis of
knowing the same secret.
In other words, A and B wish to authenticate their public
keys via a secure equality test of their secrets without revealing
any information about the latter, hence the need for a zero-
knowledge protocol. This means that the resulting transcript
of their exchanges should not leak any information on πA and
πB to M. Also, it should not be possible for M to brute-
force the password via offline dictionary attacks. Thus, M’s
only strategy would amount to making online attempts.
A. Public Key Authentication via PAKE
To determine at the end of a PAKE run whether the user
secrets πA and πB are equal, without revealing anything else,
we suggest the enforcement of explicit authentication using
key confirmation (KC) after the key establishment phase.
While this step may be optional in the general case for PAKE
protocols, here it would be necessary in order to bind the
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cryptographic material with an identity. The information that
A and B wish to authenticate—e.g., public keys for email
addresses in p≡p or key fingerprints for phone numbers in
Signal—can be incorporated either into the KC phase or into
the initial user secrets.
Next we show using a concrete example how this can be
constructed. For the moment, we do not focus on engineer-
ing aspects related to (a)synchronicity and message transport
mechanisms, but we will come back to these in Section IV-C.
The literature contains several well-studied instances of PAKE
and for this reason, we first pick a candidate to demonstrate
how it can be used for public key authentication, and then
compare a few prominent schemes according to specific prop-
erties of interest, as shown in Table I.
A.1 An Instantiation based on SPAKE2
For illustration, in Figure 1 we propose an extension
of SPAKE2, a one-round protocol, with a KC step to
achieve explicit authentication, thus binding a public key
to an entity. This yields a 2-round scheme, the minimum
when KC is enforced; see (Katz and Vaikuntanathan, 2011)
for optimal-round PAKEs. For KC we can use the generic
refresh-then-MAC transformation. Despite its long history and
popularity, this transform was only recently proved secure
(Fischlin et al., 2016).
With G being a finite cyclic group of prime order p,
generated by an element g, let G, g, p,M ←$G, N ←$G and
hash function H(·) denote public parameters and π ∈ Zp the
private low-entropy secret, with the user password assumed
to be appropriately mapped to an element in Zp. The parties
perform the key exchange phase, as shown in Figure 1, which
concludes with the generation of a symmetric key. Upon
termination of the key establishment, A and B each use the
symmetric key to carry out a key-refreshing step via a key
derivation function in order to generate fresh MAC keys (for
both parties), along with a new session key, K , which will be
the secret shared key. Next, under the freshly generated keys,
they each compute a MAC on the fingerprints of both parties’
public keys. The authentication now amounts to exchanging
and verifying the obtained tags τa and τb.
The addition of the KC step increases the number of
rounds and flows to 2 and 4, respectively. Note that this is
merely an illustrative example and as already mentioned, other
possibilities for KC do exist, some of which offer additional
properties. For instance, (Becerra et al., 2018) showed that a
modified version of SPAKE2, called PFS-SPAKE2, coupled
with a KC step can achieve perfect forward secrecy (PFS) at
the cost of increasing the number of rounds from 1 to 3. More
recently, (Abdalla and Barbosa, 2019) showed that SPAKE2
does indeed satisfy PFS even without KC under a different
hardness assumption. They also prove a version with a KC
step (yielding a better bound) almost identical to the one given
in Figure 1, except that the protocol has one less flow.
Alternatively, the public key fingerprints can be embedded
in the secret π, but note that even in that case, the KC step
cannot be skipped as an explicit authentication of the public
TABLE I
COMPARISON OF PAKE PROTOCOLS.
Protocol Rounds/
Flows
KC FS Security
model
Hardness
assump.
SPAKE2 1/2 ✗ X ROM CDH
PFS-SPAKE2 3/3 X X ROM CDH
OPAQUE 2/3 X X ROM OMDH
J-PAKE 2/4 ✗ X ROM-AAM DSDH
KV-SPOKE 1/2 ✗ - CRS DDH
RLWE-PAK 3/3 X X ROM RLWE
RLWE-PPK 2/2 ✗ X ROM RLWE
ROM: Random Oracle Model; AAM: Algebraic Adversary Model;
CRS: Common Reference String
DH: Diffie-Hellman; CDH: Computational DH; DDH: Decisional
DH; DSDH: Decision Square DH; OMDH: One-More DH; RLWE:
Ring Learning With Errors
keys would still be needed. More precisely, we would let
π = π′‖fpr(pkA)‖fpr(pkB), where π
′ denotes the original
user provided secrets, and we would compute the tags as
τa ← MAC(kaMAC, sid), where the identifier sid is computed
over the transcript, with τb computed similarly. Similar one
round KC methods for explicit authentication can be found in
IETF internet-drafts for SPAKE21 and J-PAKE2.
A.2 Choice of PAKE
We consider a number of representative PAKE
protocols and analyze their properties w.r.t. our
use case: SPAKE2 (Abdalla and Pointcheval, 2005),
OPAQUE (Jarecki et al., 2018), PFS-SPAKE2
(Becerra et al., 2018), J-PAKE (Hao and Ryan, 2010),
KV-SPOKE (Katz and Vaikuntanathan, 2011), RLWE-
PAK and PPK (Ding et al., 2017). PAKEs are typically
evaluated according to the security model in which they are
proven secure, support for forward secrecy, the number of
rounds, along with their communication and computational
complexity. The complexity related aspects become more
relevant in a client-server setting wherein a server has
to process a high number of requests and sessions. In a
decentralized peer-to-peer setting, such properties no longer
play a major role.
In Table I, we present some of the relevant properties
of the said constructions. Note that except for RLWE-PAK
and RLWE-PPK that make use of lattice-based cryptography,
all other schemes are Diffie-Hellman-based. In terms of PQ
security, an immediate implication of this is that the latter
cases would not be safe against quantum adversaries, whereas
the first two would provide conjectured quantum-security due
to the underlying RLWE problem.
Minimizing the number of rounds becomes more important
for secure email than for messaging, especially if the transport
mechanism is based on attachments or hidden emails (see
Section IV-C). As for secure messaging, this may be equally
relevant for solutions that do not operate in a purely decentral-
ized and peer-to-peer setting in which one may wish to reduce
the load on relay or buffer servers, e.g., Signal or OTR4, but
the number of rounds would in general be arguably less of a
1https://tools.ietf.org/id/draft-irtf-cfrg-spake2-08.html
2https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8236
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Public parameters: G, g, p,M ←$G, N ←$G, H ; private parameter: π ∈ Zp the low-entropy secret.
Alice Bob
x←$Zp;X ← g
x
y←$Zp;Y ← g
y
X
∗ ← X ·Mpi Y ∗ ← Y ·Npi
A, pkA, X
∗
B, pkB , Y
∗
KA ←
(
Y ∗
Npi
)x
KB ←
(
X∗
Mpi
)y
skA ← H(A,B,X
∗
, Y
∗
, pi,KA) skB ← H(A,B,X
∗
, Y
∗
, pi,KB)
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Key exchange complete; key confirmation and binding follow . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
(K, kaMAC, k
b
MAC) = KDF(skA) (K, k
a
MAC, k
b
MAC) = KDF(skB)
τ
a ← MAC(kaMAC, fpr(pkA)‖fpr(pkB)‖sid) τ
b ← MAC(kbMAC, fpr(pkA)‖fpr(pkB)‖sid)
τ
a
τ
b
Abort if τ
b
invalid; else output key K Abort if τ
a
invalid; else output key K
Fig. 1. pk authentication using SPAKE2 with refresh-then-MAC key confirmation for entity binding.
concern. Note that KC can be added to schemes that do not
have it by default at the cost of an extra round.
Intuitively, the notion of forward secrecy (FS) captures the
requirement that a long-term secret compromise should not
result in prior session keys getting compromised and conse-
quently the corresponding exchanges. Weak FS (wFS) refers to
those schemes satisfying FS against passive adversaries who
did not interfere in the previous sessions and perfect FS to
those achieving the same against active adversaries. We will
come back to this in Section IV-B2.
We limit the discussion on security models to practical
considerations. In the random oracle model (ROM), an ideal
truly random function being accessible to the parties through
oracle calls is typically instantiated using cryptographic hash
functions, and the common reference string (CRS) model
implies the accessibility of a random string to all parties,
generated in a trusted way. The latter may be less obvious
to implement in the case of email due to the constraints of
decentralization given that the generation of the CRS would be
typically done by a trusted party or via a secure MPC protocol,
see e.g., (Sasson et al., 2014) for an example of CRS genera-
tion in a decentralized setting. Finally, regarding the RLWE-
based schemes, their proofs are unfortunately in the ROM, as
opposed to the quantum ROM (QROM), which would allow
adversaries to query the random oracle in superposition.
B. Cryptographic Enhancements
We first show how a number of key properties related to key
management automation and error resilience that have been
identified in the literature (Unger et al., 2015) are satisfied
and improved upon by our approach. We then present novel
uses of PAKEs in secure email and messaging. Note that once
a PAKE-generated key is established, subsequent PAKE in-
stances can be run automatically via a chaining self-sustaining
mechanism. While we mainly focus on enhancements for ex-
isting paradigms that depend on public-keys, we also consider
possibilities for shifting to entirely symmetric-key solutions.
Indeed, once a PAKE-generated shared symmetric key has
been established, not only a wide range of well-understood
techniques become possible, but one could also consider
the benefits of transitioning to symmetric-key constructions,
e.g., MAC-based authentication and symmetric-key encryption
schemes.
In Table II, we compare our proposal with a select set of
approaches extracted from (Unger et al., 2015). Due to space
reasons, we refer the reader to the cited source for details on
the properties therein.
B.1 Key Management Automation
Automation of future key pair authentications. This is
the underlying feature facilitating the achievement of some of
the subsequent properties. Once authentication between A and
B is bootstrapped from an initial PAKE, the authentication of
new key pairs from either A or B can be automated using the
PAKE-generated shared keys without prompting the users to
yet again enter new secrets. For instance, in the case of email
(e.g., p≡p), authentication due to key pair generations can be
triggered whenever a new key pair needs to be associated with
an existing identity, or for binding a new email of A or B to a
new key pair or when keys expire. Note that upon each future
authentication, the PAKE-generated symmetric keys can be
refreshed by automatically carrying out a new PAKE.
Immediate enrolment. This property refers to a user’s keys
being reinitialized in such a way that other parties can verify
and use them immediately. The PAKE-generated key allows
to automate the new key exchange and the corresponding
authentication.
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Alert-less key renewal. Complementing the previous prop-
erty, this one refers to users not receiving alerts or warnings
prompting them to take action when other parties renew their
public keys. This would be automated similarly to immediate
enrolment.
Low key maintenance. This property pertains to the
amount of user effort required for maintaining keys, e.g., tasks
such as signing keys, renewing expired keys. For instance,
while the p≡p client does automate key generation and re-
newal, the established trust level disappears with every key
refreshment; key maintenance can be improved with PAKEs
as explained above.
Multi-device syncing. Another quite natural application of
PAKE is in the realm of device pairing and multi-device
synchronization. These typically rely on a human interactive
security protocol (HISP) and OOB techniques requiring man-
ual intervention, which can give rise to new and subtle attacks.
The application of PAKEs in other contexts for device pairing
has been considered before; it is thus natural to consider
incorporating them in multi-device syncing of email agents
and secure messaging systems.
A can enter a password in both devices to be paired, D1
and D2, triggering a PAKE protocol that establishes a secure
channel between them for synchronization; alternatively, this
can even be done asynchronously without the two devices
being online: D1 pushes its state (e.g., key store, chat or email
archive) to a server in encrypted form and later D2 retrieves
the secrets stored on the server in an oblivious manner w.r.t.
the server, see Section IV-B3 for more details. For example,
the current implementation of p≡p resorts to an ad-hoc pairing
technique for key synchronization that could benefit from such
a PAKE-based solution.
Inattentive user resistance. As discussed earlier, manual
OOB key/fingerprint verification methods are susceptible to
human error and inattentiveness. In the PAKE-based approach,
even if the users enter the wrong value, the result would not
be as catastrophic as trusting a key prepared by the adversary.
At worst, it would be inconvenient as the authentication would
fail prompting the user to eventually repeat the process.
B.2 Cryptographic Properties
Perfect forward secrecy (PFS). Once, more popular in the
context of secure messaging (e.g., Signal and OTR), PFS is
now a requirement for cipher suites supported in TLS 1.3.
PFS means that in the event of a password disclosure, prior
derived session keys remain secure. Clearly, a compromised
PAKE-generated key would have to be discarded and refreshed
via a new PAKE instance. A PAKE-chaining mechanism
that automatically performs key rotations and periodically
refreshes the long-term key would provide limited windows
of opportunity for M, after which the resulting key would be
secure again.
Several PAKE constructions provide PFS by default, some
of which are listed in Table I; it is known that PFS can
be obtained by adding explicit authentication via a KC step
(Bellare et al., 2000). This paradigm would be more relevant
when such PAKE-based approaches are used for synchroniza-
tion purposes, be it device-to-device or device-to-server where
PAKE can be used to both authenticate and establish a secure
channel, thus providing PFS for the session keys used for
syncing. For more efficiency, a symmetric-key scheme with
PFS such as SAKE (Avoine et al., 2020) can be bootstrapped
using PAKE.
Finally, the approach adopted by the Sequoia-PGP project
for adding FS to OpenPGP-based solutions using regular sub-
key rotations would also benefit from automated authentication
in case the master key, certifying the short-term sub-keys,
needs to be refreshed and authenticated. For additional secu-
rity, with slightly hampered usability, a separation of storage
can be enforced by for example storing such PAKE long-term
keys in dedicated hardware, e.g., hardware security modules
or smart key storage devices such as YubiKey or Nitrokey, to
protect against a device compromise; see Section IV-B3 for
more details on this.
Deniability. This is another subtle and fundamental property
that has been of particular interest in recent secure messaging
systems such as Signal and OTR. Deniable exchange, applied
to tasks ranging from authentication to encryption, has a
long and somewhat controversial history due to the subtleties
in various existing security definitions. We limit ourselves
to the case of key exchange and the seminal framework
of (Di Raimondo et al., 2006) providing security definitions
in the simulation paradigm for deniable key exchange and
authentication in which message and participation repudiation
are considered as requirements.
Since limited space does not allow us to elaborate, we
consider only sender/receiver deniability for non-augmented
PAKE, i.e., symmetric. We conjecture that such a construc-
tion would satisfy the said definition of deniability in the
symmetric-key setting: in a two-party setup, a malicious party
M would not be able to produce binding cryptographic
proofs from communication transcripts, associating a party
with a particular exchange, as all exchanges could have been
simulated by the accusing party M. We now observe that a
simulator can be constructed as π is the only private input
shared by both parties and all other parameters are public
and drawn at random. Finally, assuming composability, using
the PAKE-generated key with symmetric ciphers and MAC-
based authentication would preserve deniability. Clearly, this
and other forms of deniability for PAKE need to be studied
rigorously in future work.
Post-quantum security. As pointed out in Section IV-A2,
in the event that secure messaging and email tools transition to
PQ cryptography, there are candidate PAKE constructions that
provide conjectured PQ security; see Table I. Moreover, a PQ-
secure PAKE can be combined with the recent symmetric-key
authenticated key exchange (SAKE) by (Avoine et al., 2020)
that provides PFS to obtain an efficient, PQ-secure and pri-
marily symmetric key scheme with PFS. A quantum-resistant
PAKE can be used once to bootstrap authentication via low-
entropy secrets and to provide the initial master key needed
by SAKE, which is conjectured to be PQ-secure due to its use
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of symmetric-key primitives, thus offering a low cost and effi-
cient PQ-AKE suitable for settings with limited computational
power.
B.3 Secure Secret Retrieval and Storage
OPAQUE is a recent construction that can, among other
things, serve as an aPAKE to offer protection against breaches
and server password file compromises. It also offers a secret
retrieval mechanism, based on oblivious pseudo-random func-
tions, to retrieve a secret from a server, stored in encrypted
form, using only a low-entropy password.
This feature is inspired by the notion of password-
protected secret sharing (PPSS) schemes formalized by
(Bagherzandi et al., 2011), which are (t, n)-threshold con-
structions wherein security is preserved against an adversary
controlling up to t servers out of n. A problem that PPSS
addresses is protecting A’s secret data d (e.g., cryptographic
secret key used for decryption, authentication credentials, etc)
in the event of a device compromise.
Such a scheme would secret-share d among a set of n
agents so that only a collusion of more than t corrupt ones
would compromise the data. Secret-sharing is combined with
a password-based mechanism that allows the authentication of
the owner of d to the secret-share holders in order to trigger
a reconstruction protocol and retrieve the secret. The private
storage of d can be shared among n external network entities
to protect against user device compromise. Alternatively, if A
does not trust external entities, her device can partake in the
secret-sharing by storing multiple shares instead of any other
external entity, thus preventing online dictionary attacks by a
network attacker and not allowingM to learn anything about
the secret without corrupting A’s device.
Secret retrieval would have several use cases in secure
messaging. For instance, instead of retrieving contacts from the
user’s phone, servers could store lists of contacts in encrypted
form; this would enable asynchronous syncing of contacts
across multiple devices without the service provider learning
the content3. A general anonymity/privacy related criticism
directed at messaging services has to do with the identification
of users via their phone numbers. This can be dealt with by
securely storing long-term identities in encrypted form on the
server, accessible only to the users.
Another use case would be to secret-share user data among
several of their own devices, e.g., smartphone, laptop and
tablet, so that a device compromise would not provide any
useful information to an attacker; this can also be used for
3It is worth noting that the developers of the Signal secure messaging
protocol seem to have recently developed a similar functionality for the Signal
application, which they refer to as “Secure Value Recovery” (Signal, 2020a).
Among other things, they describe a design involving a key stretching of
a user’s PIN and a master key derivation using the stretched key and a
piece of server-side stored randomness. The same core functionality can be
achieved using well-known solutions discussed in our work, i.e., the use of
either PPSS or PAKE constructions such as OPAQUE for secure secret storage
and retrieval. Signal’s developers also mention secret sharing and oblivious
pseudo-random functions as future possibilities (Signal, 2020b), both of which
can be achieved using existing cryptographic primitives, as explained in this
section.
performing key synchronization among multiple devices. All
these mechanisms would work in a similar manner from the
user’s point of view, i.e., simply by providing a password.
B.4 Auditable PAKEs for Thwarting Online Guessing At-
tacks
As is the case for SMP in OTR, online guessing attacks are
unavoidable in PAKEs. This is usually dealt with by fixing a
limit on the number of failed attempts that can be tolerated
before invalidating a password.
However, in certain cases, another subtle adversarial strategy
aimed at sidestepping the (at most) one online test per run
would be to resort to a class of guess and abort attacks in
whichM intercepts a message in a given session (or initiates
a session of her own) at a crucial step of a protocol run, verifies
her guess at the password and in case of an incorrect guess,
drops the said message to disguise her attempt as a network
communication failure.
This can be done in both directions to double the chance of
discovering the password, or in parallel against many network
nodes depending on the setting. Such an attack can be carried
out repeatedly without raising an alarm as the honest parties
may simply view this as a network failure.
We identify a similar vulnerability in the use of a modified
version of SMP in OTR: just before the last phase where
the parties perform their secure equality test, when A and
M exchange their blinded DH terms incorporating the low-
entropy password in the exponent, i.e., (ga
3
, ga
1
gπA
2
), M could
make a guessing attempt at πA and in case of obtaining 0 (not
equal), drop the message and force an abort, see sections 4.2
and 4.3 in (Alexander and Goldberg, 2007). Note that the non-
interactive zero-knowledge (NIZK) proofs that are attached
to the messages at every exchange are not meant to protect
against this type of attack.
In a relatively recent work, (Roscoe and Ryan, 2017) apply
a mechanism based on commitment schemes and delay func-
tions (e.g., timed-release encryption), originally developed by
(Roscoe, 2016) for protecting against online attacks in HISPs
that use SAS, to the setting of PAKEs in order to make them
auditable by achieving stochastic fair exchange.
Roughly speaking, this is achieved by a transformation for
PAKEs at the level of KC using a combination of blinding,
randomization, commitments and delay functions such that a
series of messages consisting of fake ones and the real in-
tended message are exchanged and the parties will only get to
know which is the right one until their exchange is complete.
In a follow-up work, (Couteau et al., 2019) generalize this
result to achieve ε-fair exchange using oblivious transfer and
timed-release encryption.
This transformation can be used to enhance any PAKE
with auditability, thus lending itself quite naturally to the
authentication method suggested in this work. An important
limitation here is that, due to the highly interactive design of
the solution, it would be more suitable to the setting of secure
messaging than email, unless a given email solution were to
opt for untrusted buffer servers for transport, see Section IV-C.
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COMPARISON OF TRUST ESTABLISHMENT APPROACHES.
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Web of Trust PGP    G# G# ✗ ✗ - ✗ ✗ ✗ G# G# ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗    
KD + SaL CONIKS  ✗ G#    ✗ - ✗             
OE + SMP OTR G# G# G# G#   - - ✗ ✗  ✗ ✗ G# G# ✗  ✗  ✗  
OE + TOFU TextSecure G# G# G# G# ✗  - - -       ✗  ✗   ✗
OE + TOFU + OOB p≡p G# G# G#  G#  - - -  G#  G# ✗  ✗ ✗ ✗  ✗ ✗
OE + TOFU + PAKE - G# G# G#  G#          ✗       
KFV + OOB SilentText     G#  - - - ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗  ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗
KFV + PAKE -     G#          ✗       
Paradigm property is:  = satisfied; G# = partially satisfied; ✗ = not satisfied;  = implementation dependent; - = N/A
KD = Key directory; KFV = Key fingerprint verification; OE = Opportunistic encryption; SaL = Self-auditable logs; TOFU = Trust-on-first-use
Finally, note that some of the ideas in this transformation,
specifically those related to enforcing fairness, have com-
mon elements with the original SMP (Boudot et al., 2001)
solution aimed at providing fairness, a property that was
removed from the modified version of SMP used in OTR
(Alexander and Goldberg, 2007) on account of achieving ef-
ficiency.
C. Transport Mechanism
Email-based approach. Given the small number of rounds
required by PAKE protocols, in the case of email we can
afford to use standard email attachments or specially formatted
hidden emails as messages’ carriers, processed by the email
client in the background.
A can choose (via an interface option) to enter her secret
πA upon sending her first email, allowing the first flow of the
protocol to occur via an attachment; similarly, when B replies,
if he opts for entering his secret πB , the initial PAKE round
would be done; the subsequent KC can be done automatically
by the dedicated software.
Alternatively, one can resort to a hidden email transport
model such as the one used by p≡p for multi-device key
synchronization. Here, the implementations would encapsulate
crypto messages in specially crafted email attachments, kept
hidden from the user (e.g., archived separately) and processed
automatically. Since we primarily deal with authentication, our
proposal would have minimal impact in terms of communica-
tion and computational complexity as it would have to take
place only once.
Untrusted server approach. Although early IM tools were
entirely online services that maintained an active session
for each conversation, modern IM tools are in fact quite
similar to email in that the underlying system follows an
asynchronous model. Both Signal and the latest version of
OTR (OTRv4-development, 2019) achieve offline messaging
by using “buffer servers” for hosting pre-key bundles that can
be fetched without the other party being online.
We can use a similar mechanism to overcome transport
engineering obstacles in email more elegantly, since all aspects
related to the exchange of emails remain unchanged and thus
interoperable. In fact, the use of an intermediate server would
not introduce additional trust assumptions as the transcript
of a PAKE protocol does not leak useful information to the
adversary; such a server would be untrusted and any entity
would be able to set up their own instance.
D. Security and Low-Entropy Secrets
The schemes considered thus far come with proofs of
security, see Table I for the corresponding models and assump-
tions. The security guarantees can be traced back to the core
properties of PAKEs: they can in effect fulfill the role of ZK
proof of knowledge schemes such that a run of the protocol
does not leak any information on the password and upon
termination only reveals whether the secrets were equal; they
resist offline dictionary attacks and online ones by limiting
active adversarial tests to one password per run; compromised
session keys will not compromise the security of other session
keys; depending on the choice of PAKE; FS would ensure that
past session keys remain secure if the password is leaked.
The only way for M to gain knowledge about the secret
would be via active online guessing attempts, typically dealt
with by fixing a limit on the number of failed attempts,
e.g., SMP in OTR. We discussed how the possibility of
making PAKEs auditable can be used to mitigate this class of
attacks by distinguishing between failed adversarial attempts
and network failures to minimize the adversary’s tries to one,
under the assumption of correct input entry by honest users.
Low-entropy secret agreement. Our proposal does come
with its own caveat, namely the need for either presharing or
agreeing on a low-entropy secret in-band. As already discussed
in (Alexander and Goldberg, 2007), the users can either share
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a secret over a secure channel, e.g. OOB, or agree on one
via an in-band solution without revealing sensitive information
about the secret itself, for instance, A asking B to use the
name of their favorite restaurant. The user interface of a tool
implementing this could warn users not to include the secret
itself, similar to standard email warnings reminding users to
attach documents in case they have mentioned it in the body
of the message.
Another possibility would be to use another already authen-
ticated and secure channel to agree on a secret. For instance,
given the widespread use of tools such as Signal, the parties
could simply use it to agree on a secret for a one-time entity
authentication of their secure email solution. While it may
not be appealing from a theoretical point of view, due to
the assumption of there being an already authenticated and
secure channel, practically speaking, this approach would in
fact provide a realistic and usable solution.
Usability aspects. Implementations of the approach must
pay proper attention in providing an adequate interface for
entering the low-entropy secret, in addition to the usual con-
siderations for providing easy explanations and documentation
for users. A lesson learned from a usability study on the
OTR/SMP tool (Stedman et al., 2008) stresses the need for
further research on how to guide users towards establishing a
secure shared human-memorable secret.
For instance, adding a list pre-populated with questions
might serve as a guide to generate similar ones or reduce
user effort by allowing them to choose one from the list; the
questions should not lead to evident answers or to answers
belonging to very small known sets, such as “yes/no” or colors,
as such cases increase the successful guessing probability of
the adversary. Another measure for dealing with disparities due
to letter cases would be to just convert the secret to upper-case,
at the cost of reducing entropy.
V. FUTURE WORK
We foresee as a next step an implementation of our proposal,
along with research on usability dedicated to assisting users
with deriving low-entropy secrets, reducing mental effort and
the likelihood of mistakes. We also consider an analysis of
our approach applied to encrypted mailing lists. Furthermore,
we expect follow-up theoretical work on all the suggested
cryptographic enhancements and implementations thereof.
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